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THE PRICE SYSTEM, INcREAS:NG PRODUCTIVITY
AND RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
THE institution of prices has played a major part in the eco-
nomic changes of recent years. In a::'l exchange economy in-
dividual prices and that intangible entity termed the price
structure constitute the controlling agency through which
all economic activities are regulated and coordinated. This
task of coordination has become more difficult with the
increasing complexity of economic life.
Over its long history the institutio:rl of prices has been sub-
ject to many influences that have enlarged its scope, modified
its characteristics and affected its operations. The breakdown
of mercantilism and other controls gave a greater degree of
freedom to prices and hence of flexibility to the economic
system. Later the movement was in. the other direction—
towards price-fixing and wage control by regulatory bodies
and powerful private interests, towards the piling up of fixed
expenses in industrial production and the accompanying
accentuation of the relatively inflexible elements in selling
prices. In the main, these were slow changes, and the modifi-
cations they wrought in the working of the price system were
gradual. The movements of the last half century, for which
price records are more comprehensive, may be traced with
more precision. A wide variety of forces has played upon the
price system of the United States and upon international
price relations over this period. Internal price relations have
been altered by shifts in consumer demand, by changes in
productive efficiency, by the pushing out of producing mar-
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gins, by changes in marketing mechanisms and by other fac-
tors that have altered production costs and the selling prices
of individual commodities. Of a different order have been
those forces that have affected the 'operating characteristics'
of the price system. Regulation, private and public controls,
the growth of national advertising and consequent increase
in the power of manufacturers to exercise direct control over
ultimate selling prices, the steadily expanding burden of over-
head—all these tend towards the creation o rigid elements
and fixed relations in the price structure, with far reaching
consequences for the working of the system as a whole. At
the same time the price system has been exposed to a series
of violent pressures in some degree at least of external origin
—War-time inflation, post-War deflation, and the world-wide
recession that began in 1929. Pressures from the monetary
side, falling with varying incidence upon national price struc-
tures, have complicated the price shifts of more narrowly-
localized origin. Finally, we must note that international ties
were disrupted by non-intercourse during the War and post-
War years, by the breaking down of the gold standard and by
serious impairment of world trade since 1929. It was inevi-
table that these various movements should have influenced
profoundly the adjustments and correlations that are effected
through the price system, and the welfare of great groups of
producers and consumers. Our present concern is with these
changes and some of their economic consequences.
EXPANSION OF FABRICATIONAL MARGINS, 19 13—1936
The outstanding feature of the price history of the last
twenty years, as regards internal relations among the prices
of various commodity groups, has been the widening of the
margin between raw and processed goods—the margin repre-
senting fabricational and distributional costs. In essence, all432 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
the price shifts that have been discussed in detail in preced-
ing sections are aspects of this major movement—a movement
the more striking because it reverses deep-seated and persist-
ent pre-War tendencies. The low returns and deficient pur-
chasing power of important classes of primary producers in
post-War years are related to this movement. The relatively
high prices of articles intended for use in capital equipment
are due in some degree to high of manufacture. The
prevalence during the entire post-War period of a plateau
of high prices for finished goods intended for human con-
sumption is another aspect of the same situation.
This curious widening of the margin between the prices
of raw and manufactured goods is the more remarkable in
view of the increasing productivity of labor in manufactur-
ing industries during the last twenty years. From 1914 to
1929 output per wage earner in manufacturing industries of
the United States increased about 49 per cent. Yet, while the
Bureau of Labor Statistics index of wholesale prices was
advancing 40 per cent, during this the average selling
price of manufactured goods (as derived from Census records)
rose 45percent. (Fabrication costs plus profits, per unit of
product, rose 66 per cent.) The same conditions prevailed
among the two groups of manufactu:red goods that have been
given special attention here. Manufactured goods intended
for human consumption, for which output per wage earner
increased 44 per cent over this fifteen-year period, advanced
44 per cent in per unit selling price. Still greater was the
rise in production per wage earnerper cent) in the manu-
facture of goods intended for use iii capital equipment, yet
here the advance in selling price pe:r unit was 40 per cent, a
rise equal to that of general commodity prices, at wholesale.
In following these relations through the periods of reces-
sion and recovery we have noted the customary expansion of
the margin between raw and processed goods during reces-PRODUCTIVITY AND PRICES 433
sion, as the prices of raw materials collapsed, and the suc-
ceeding reduction of the margin with recovery. It is in order
at this point briefly to summarize the situation existing in
the summer of 1936 and to consider the general nature of the
problems then persisting.
In June 1936 the prices of manufactured goods, at whole-
sale, were i6 per cent below the level of July 1929; the prices
of raw producers' goods were 22 per cent below. Relatively
to the 1913base,the price index for manufactured goods was
128, for raw producers' goods 104.Recoveryhad narrowed
the wide margin that developed during the recession but
still left manufactured goods in a position of advantage. This
margin of advantage amounted to 8 per cent with reference
to 1929 relations, to 23 per cent with reference to pre-War
parity.
One effect of this change was to reduce the average worth
of all raw materials, in exchange for commodities in general
at wholesale, to 5 per cent below the July 1929 level and to
io per cent below the 1913level.The loss was greatest, rela-
tively, for raw agricultural products. Taking account of
values at the farm in relation to retail prices paid by farmers,
the average per unit worth of farm products in June 1936
showed net declines of 8 per cent on the July 1929 base, 11
percent on the pre-War base (the average of the five years,
August 1909—July 1914).
Turning now to the June 1936 position of goods intended
for use in capital equipment and for direct human consump-
tion, we find the average per unit worth of building materials
31percent higher than in 1913.(Worth,or purchasing
power, is here measured in terms of commodities in general,
at wholesale.) For processed goods intended for use in cap-
ital equipment the corresponding gains in real exchange
value were 4 per cent, with reference to July 1929,14 per
cent with reference to 1913.Forprocessed consumers' goods434 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
the average per unit worth in June 1936 was 2percent greater
than in 1929, 8 per cent greater thanIfl 1913. (This means,
of course, that the index number of wholesale prices, for
processed consumers' goods, stood higher, by these relative
amounts, than the general index of wholesale prices.)
We find, therefore, that although some of the greatest dis-
parities created during the recession had been removed by
1936,thereremained a net addition to the differences result-
ing from the divergent price movements of the period 1914—
29. Some reasons for this were founi in the detailed review
of the prIce changes affecting different commodity groups.
In particular, it was noted that although the six-year period
of recession and recovery brought an increase approximating
25 per cent in output per man hour, the real per unit worth
of manufactured goods (i.e., their e:Kchange value for goods
in general) and real labor costs per unit of product increased.
This discussion raises a fundamental question: Did price
differences growing out of this expai:iding margin restrict the
effective demand for finished goods on the part of potential
buyers—buyers of capital goods, on the one hand, of finished
consumers' goods on the other? This question relates not only
to the periods of recession and recovery that filled the years
1929—36, but also to the period of expansion that preceded
the recession. The answer to this question may not be given
in terms of prices alone, for behind prices lie changes in
productivity, in costs, in income distribution and in related
elements that affect immediately the movements of goods
into final use. Indeed, before attempting to answer the central
question we must give attention to i.ssues relating to the in-
cidence and effects of increasing productivity. For the whole
problem of a changing fabricational margin, with all its pos-
sible effects on the status of primary producers, fabricators,
buyers of capital equipment and final consumers, centers, inPRODUCTIVITY AND PRICES
its recent manifestations, on the incidence of gains in in-
dustrial productivity.
ON THE INCIDENCE AND EFFECTS OF GAINS IN INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCTIVITY
As we have followed changes in industrial productivity in
this study we have measured productivity in terms of output
per man or per man hour. In using such measurements we
should be aware of their possible inadequacy. Changes in
industrial methods that involve greater use of machinery
substitute indirect labor for some part of the direct labor
displaced by the machines. That is, men employed in the
final operations of manufacture are replaced by machines
the production and maintenance of which require human
effort. (As regards the production of the machines, this means
that some increase in overhead costs is to be expected, when
direct labor costs are reduced.) Usually, of course, there is
a diminution of the total human energy required for a given
productive operation, since the stimulus to the greater use
of machines is provided by a potential reduction of costs.
But it is certain that the 'per man' or 'per man hour' standard
of measurement, applied to the final stage of manufacturing
operations, overstates the true gain in productivity, since it
does not include a measure of the correlated increase in in-
direct labor. The measurements of productivity employed
in the present study cover a large percentage of all manufac-
turing operations, including those relating to the production
of capital goods, as well as final consumption goods. Thus
account is taken of a considerable part of the indirect labor
entering into the production of finished goods. Some of the
indirect labor, however, is omitted (labor in extraction of
minerals for use in capital equipment, and labor entering
into some highly fabricated equipment, the output of which436 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
is not readily measured). So, comprehensive as they are, the
present measurements of productivity changes probably
overstate somewhat the. over-all gains in productivity over
the periods studied.
But our interest lies at the moment in the reduction of
money costs that increasing productivity may be expected to
bring. The potential reduction of costs is a reduction, per unit
of output, in terms of the scale of costs prevailing prior to
a given operating change that enhances industrial produc-
tivity. For later, when the advantages of the increased produc-
tivity have been realized and the appropriated by one
party or another, money costs per unit of output may con-
ceivably be as high as before. It is an aspect of this problem—
the division or allocation of the money gains resulting from
higher productivity—that now concerns us.
The money gains from increased productivity may accrue
to producers of raw materials, to fab:cicators or to consumers.
Were competitive conditions such that sellers of raw materials
were able to demand higher prices lust when lower fabrica-
tional costs created a fund open to appropriation, producers
of raw materials might conceivably secure the gains. Again,
competitive conditions among producers and buyers might
be such as to enforce lower selling prices, in which case the
buyers of fabricated goods would profit. Or, finally, the
situation might make it possible for the agents of fabrication
themselves to appropriate the gains, paying no more for raw
materials and selling their products at the same prices as
before.
In this last situation a further question arises as to the
division of the incremental gain among the various claimants
here lumped together as 'agents of fabrication'. Manufactur-
ing labor might benefit, through higher pay per unit of goods
turned out. Owners of land or other natural resources might
be enabled to secure higher rents. Those providing credit,PRODUCTIVITY AND PRICES 437
or funds for capital equipment, might secure higher returns.
More might go to governmental units, through higher taxes
on the earnings of business enterprises. Or the increased pro-
ductivity might lead to higher profits, to be distributed as
dividends or accumulated as surplus.
Looking first at the physical relations involved in these
changes, it is clear that higher productivity will make pos-
sible the production of more goods with the same expenditure
of effort or the same volume of goods with a smaller expendi-
ture of effort. The latter condition may take the form of an
increase in voluntary leisure, or an increase in involuntary
unemployment. Which of these results will follow, or what
combination of these effects will follow, will depend upon
a number of factors.
Various possible effects of gains in industrial productivity,
as variously divided, may be suggested in the following sum-
mary:
A. Reduction in working hours of men employed, with higher
time rates of pay; aggregate disbursements to agents of produc-
tion and division of disbursements unchanged; selling price un-
changed.
Here the gain takes the form of additional leisure. There is no
increase in the demand for goods, and no change in the distribu-
tion of purchasing power.1 There is no stimulus to the produc-
tion of a greater volume of goods.
B. Reduction in the number employed, with higher time rates
of pay to those still employed, and no change in aggregate
amount disbursed to labor and to other agents of production.
No change occurs in selling price.
Increased unemployment, on the one hand, higher per capita
returns to employed labor, on the other, will characterize this
1Withtime, as the new leisure changes living habits, a change might occur
in the directions in which wage earners' incomes are expended. But the
change is remote, and less definite than the other shifts here outlined.
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situation. With the higher per capita income of employed labor,
some change will occur in the direction in which purchasing
power is expended.
C. Reduction in working hours withsame or a smaller force
and the same time rates of pay; selling price unchanged.
Here there is no change in the aggregate amount disbursed
to the agents of production, but there is a shift in its division.
Agents of production other than labor receive a larger propor-
tion of the aggregate, labor receives a smaller portion. Unem-
ployment (or enforced leisure) accompanies the shift. Some mod-
ification occurs in the direction in which purchasing power is
expended, with the changed distribution of the aggregate dis-
bursement.
D. Reduction in selling prices.
Initial lowering of aggregate receipts and of amount disbursed
to agents of production. Possible initial unemployment. Release
of buying power of consumers for purchase of more goods of the
same type, or other goods. (The direction of expenditures of
purchasing power thus released will depend upon the elasticities
of demand for the many products in question.)
The central feature of these severil situations is, that pro-
ductive energy is released by the gain in productivity. The
critical question is whether this released energy is to be uti-
lized and if so, how. In an economy regulated by an omnis-
cient dictator the answer would be simple. There could be
more leisure, or the energy could be allocated as the dictator
should decide. But where the allocation is effected through
the instrumentality of the price systeni, in an economy marked
by prices partly free and partly controlled, the problem is
more complex. Here it is the pressure of purchasing power
through the price system that gives the answer to the ques-
tion. For in every situation except that described under (A)
above, some shift occurs in the direction in which current
purchasing power is expended, after the gain in productivity
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occurs. What is of prime importance, in the actual situation,
is the kind of connection that may be established between the
purchasing power thus shifted and the productive energy
released by the increase in productivity.
This connection may be direct, in which case the difficul-
ties attendant upon the economic changes involved are re-
duced to a minimum. Or, in place of a direct transmission
of purchasing power to released energies, there may be an
indirect connection and a diffused transmission. At one ex-
treme, representing the most direct connection between pur-
chasing power and released productive energies, is the situa-
tion in which the selling price of a commodity is reduced to
the full extent made possible by the increase in productivity,
and in which the demand for the commodity is highly elastic.
In such a situation a large part of the purchasing power of
consumers released by the reduction in price would find an
outlet through an increased demand for the commodity in
question. Increased production would result, with prompt
re-employment of all or part of the productive energies re-
leased by the initial increase in productive power. At the
other extreme is the situation in which no reduction in sell-
ing price occurs; full advantage of the reduction of costs flows
to stockholders, let us say, in the form of higher dividends.
The increased purchasing power of stockholders would find
expression through various channels of investment and direct
consumption. Most of these channels would be far removed
from the commodity in question, and there would be little or
no increase in the demand for it. Only by indirection and at
long remove would the energies released in the industry first
concerned find employment through the slow diffusion of
the enhanced purchasing power of stockholders. Under these
conditions unemployment might persist in this industry for
a long period.
Between these two extremes are many combinations of440 PRICESIN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
price changes and purchasing power shifts, resulting from
increases in productivity, and many degrees of diffusion of
purchasing power. The rapidity and ease of adaptation to
the new productive and conditions created by
productivity changes might vary enoirnously, depending upon
the closeness of the connection established between the en-
hanced purchasing power of partictilar groups and the pro-
ductive energies released by improvements in technique and
organization.
We should note, however, that in a completely frictionless
economy, marked by free prices, with wages and other ele-
ments of production costs completely flexible, with labor and
capital completely mobile, the enhanced purchasing power
of special groups would be diffused promptly throughout the
economy and connection would be established without delay
between this purchasing power and the released productive
energies. Under these conditions the disposition of the gains
from increased productivity would be a matter of indiffer-
ence, in so far as the question of faulty economic adjustments
and persistent unemployment of productive facilities is con-
cerned. For maladjustments, marked by unemployment,
could not be present. (The rnanner in which the fruits of
higher productivity were apportioned would be important,
of course, as regards the status of different economic groups;
that matter is not here in question.) In an economy marked
by frictions of many types, however-—by rigid prices, inflexi-
ble rates for services of many sorts, :mmobility of labor and
capital—innumerable barriers stand in the way of the wide
and prompt diffusion of purchasing power. The pressure
of new purchasing power in one segment of the economic
system may exert a negligible effect on displaced labor and
idle capital in a remote section, within time limits that have
significance for ordinary human activities.
This, of course, is the situation we face today. FrictionsPRODUCTIVITY AND PRICES 441
there have always been in the economic systems with which
men have actually worked. As frictions of some types disap-
peared, new frictions have developed. The twentieth cen-
tury has witnessed many new encroachments upon the ideal
freedom of the competitive system. Accordingly, the manner
in which the gains resulting from higher productivity are
apportioned is not a matter of indifference, as regards the
efficiency of the economic system and the maximum utiliza-
tion of productive resources. For the gains of enhanced
productivity are potential gains, merely. In their first form
they appear as reductions in the energy necessary to pro.
duce stated quantities of goods. Unless the benefits of the
released energy are realized, no true advances occur. For
this reason, the apportionment of the potential benefits of
higher productivity is of high social concern. The more di-
rect the connection between enhanced purchasing power
and productive energy released by new techniques, the less
the maladjustment and the more efficient the utilization of the
new techniques. The less direct the connection, and the
more diffused the transmission of new purchasing power to
released productive energies, the greater and the more pro-
tracted are the resulting disturbances likely to be.
DIvIsIoN OF THE GAINS IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIVITY: THE
HISTORICAL RECORD, 1899—1933
With this argument in mind we may review the changes of
recent years against a background of earlier movements.
We shall attempt to trace the incidence of changes in indus-
trial productivity, by estimating the concurrent changes in
the returns of fabricators and in the real costs of manu-
factured goods to various classes of buyers. The assumptions
made and the limitations attaching to the measurements
will be noted in the course of the discussion.442 PRICESIN RECESSIONAND RECOVERY
SHARES OF PRODUCERS
We first note the changes in manufacturing productivity,
measured with reference to the number of workers or of
man hours worked, and the returns to fabricators, during
three periods. These measurements appear in the accompany-
ing table. They are shown graphically in Figure
15
15.
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During the fifteen years preceding the War output per
worker employed in manufacturing plants increased almost
30 per cent. With this we may compare the real returns, perPRODUCTIVITY AND PRICES 443




Change in output per worker, or per man
hour worked' +29.6 +48.6 +19.0
Change in real returns, per worker em-
ployed, or per man hour worked,1 of
Wage earners, manufacturing plants+4.8 +36.9 +15.5
Ownership and management, manu-
facturing plants +2.2 +15.2
Allagents of fabrication +2.8 +51.3 +15.4
1 Forthe periods 1899—1914and1914—29thefigures are all on the basis
'per worker employed'. This is a faulty standard of reference, to the extent
that average working hours changed over these periods. Information con-
cerning hours of labor during these periods is scanty. Estimates by Douglas
(for the first period) and by Wolman and the National Industrial Conference
Board (for the second period) indicate that average full time hours of work,
in manufacturing industries, declined about 6 or 7 per cent between 1899
and 1914andfrom 6 to 8 per cent between 1914and1929.Fromthese figures,
apd scattered evidence of other types, we may estimate, roughly, that output
per man hour increased from 35 to 38 per cent between 1899 and 1914and
from 50 to 6o per cent between 1914and1929.(TheNational Industrial
Conference Board has published an estimate ofper cent, for the increase
in output per man hour from 1914to1929;seeThirty Hour Week, 1935,
p.17.)Butthese figures, at best, are approximations. It seems well to use
measurements of output per worker for the period prior to 1929,remember-
ing that these understate the true gains in productivity. For the period
1929—1933,whenworking hours were subject to more extreme variations,
and for which we have more accurate measurements of such changes, a
man hour of work is the unit of reference.
The figures in this and the following table are given to one decimal
place, for the purpose of formal consistency. The margin of error is, of
course, greater than this.
The present estimate of change in output per man hour from 1929to
1933, which is based upon data relating to a large and representative sample
of manufacturing industries, differs somewhat from other estimates issued
by the National Bureau (see Bulletins 53 and 58).
by dividing the aggregate monetary returns of the two groups
by the number of wage earners employed, and deflating
the measurements thus secured by appropriate indexes of444 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
the prices of goods for which the money returns of the two
groups are spent.2 The comparison for the pre-War period
shows only slight gains in the rea] rewards of these two
groups of producers. The gain of wage earners, per capita,
amounted to 4.8 per cent; for ownership and management,
per worker employed, 2.2 per cent; and for the combined
groups, 2.8 per cent. These fall far short of the gain of
29.6 per cent in output per worker. The gains of enhanced
productivity, between 1899 and went, in the main, to
groups other than the agents of fabrication.
Over the next fifteen years, 1914--29, output per worker
increased 48.6 per cent, The fruits of this notable advance
went largely to fabricators, as is clear from the other entries
for this period. The real rewards, per capita, of manufac-
turing wage earners, advanced 36.9 per cent, while for own-
ership and management the gain, per worker employed,
amounted to 61.5 per cent. For the combined groups the
gain was 51.3 per cent. The fact that 1914 was a year of
depression, while 1929 was one of prosperity, accounts in
part for this substantial gain which exceeded the rise in
productivity. But as to the reality of the gain there is no
question. Producing groups in manufacturing industries
2 The deflator, for wage earners, is the index of cost of living for industrial
workers. For the ownership and management group (a mixed class of salaried
workers, shareholders, bondholders, and other miscellaneous claimants) the
deflator is an index secured by averaging index numbers of living costs
(with a weight of 2), wholesale prices (weight cf 2) and the prices of finished
capital goods (weight of i).Thetwo indexes arecombined,in securing the
measurements for all agents of fabrication, with weights based on the im-
portance of each group. These deflators are to be considered only as rough




Wage earners 100.0136.3 100.0170.1 100.076.2
Ownership and management 128.5 100.0158.3 100.074.1
Allagents of fabrication 100.0131.9 100.0163.5 100.074.9PRODUCTIVITY AND PRICES 445
gained greatly in their market relations between 1914 and
1929. Payments for the services they rendered, measured,
for convenience, on a per worker basis, increased much
more rapidly than did the cost of the goods they bought.
Recession and depression brought an advance of some 19
per cent in output per man hour worked. The rewards of
manufacturing labor, and of ownership and management,
computed on a man hour basis, show gains approximating
15 per cent. Total returns declined substantially, of course,
but for each man hour of work agents of fabrication scored
appreciable advances during the period of decline. These
gains fell only slightly below the increase in productivity.
Itappears that producers shared but
slightly in the rewards of the pre-War advance in industrial
productivity. The fruits of the great advance of the next
fifteen years went largely, however, to agents of fabrication,
particularly to the mixed group classed as 'ownership and
management'. During recession and depression, also, the
rewards of these groups, per man hour worked, advanced
only slightly less than did output per man hour.
SHARES OF CONSUMERS
To complete the picture we turn now to the side of the
consumer. We lack data for many consuming groups but
we may estimate with reasonable accuracy the changes af-
fecting three or four important classes. In measuring the
cost to these consumers of the services of fabricators we take
account only of manufactured goods intended for human
consumption. These are not finished consumers' goods, for
we do not have adequate material for completely finished
goods, but changes in fabricational costs of goods ultimately
to be consumed are, in fact, the movements that concern us.
Decreases in the per unit costs of fabrication, for such goods,446 PRICESIN RECESSION ANDRECOVERY
to selected groups of buyers may be compared with' changes
in the real costs offabricationof manufactured goods in
general, resulting from increases of industrial productivity.
The accompanying measurements, which areportrayed
graphically in Figurei6, define changes. The figures
are to be taken as approximations since available data do
not make possible complete accuracy in the tracing of these
movements.
The measurements in the first of the tabulation, which
define (approximately)changes in the productive effort re-
FIGURE i6
ESTIMATED CHANGES IN REAL COSTS OF FABRICATION TO MANU-
FACTURING PRODUCERS AND IN CORRESPONDING REAL COSTS
OF MANUFACTURING SERVICES TO VARIOUS CONSUMING
GROUPS, 1899—1)33
Real cost to salaried workers,
nanufactunng
Real cost to primary producers,
industries
Reil cpst of' fabrication,
per unit of product
Real cost to farmers











1899-1914 1914- 1929 1929-1933
Measurements relate to average costs per Unit u)fgoodsproduced and bought.PRODUCTIVITY AND PRICES 447
CHANGES IN MANUFACTURING PRODUCTIVITY AND THE
FORTUNES OF CONSUMING GROUPS 1
1899—19141914—I 92 91929—1933
(percentage)
Change in real per unit cost of fabrication,
in effort expended by producers —22.8 —32.7
Changein real per unit cost of fabrication
to buyers of goods intended for human
consumption
Farmers —20.9 +15.2 +50.1
Wage earners, general —23.4 —27.1 —13.8
Salariedworkers, manufacturing —ii.8 —17.6 +12.5
Primaryproducers, non-agricultural —o.i +20.9 —1.5
1 The figures in this table require some explanation. The index numbers in
the first line, measuring changes in the 'real cost of fabrication' are the
reciprocals of the measurements of productivity. Thus in place of Q/N
(total output divided by number of workers) we have NIQ(totalnumber
of workers divided by number of units produced). If we accept N as a
measure of the aggregate effort expended in manufacturing production,
N/Q will measure the effort per unit of goods produced. The defects of
Q/N as a true measure of industrial productivity are present also in N/Q.
N does not measure all 'real productive effort'. It is defective in that non-
wage earners are not included, and also in that some of the effort embodied
in capital equipment is excluded. It may be assumed, although the assump-
tion is not altogether justified, that although N does not include all types
of productive effort, other types vary with N. Noting its defects, we may use
N/Q as a rough index of changes in actual productive effort per unit of
manufactured goods produced. (For the last period the index is based upon
total man hours divided by number of units produced.)
The money cost, to buyers, of the contribution of fabricators to one unit
of manufactured goods is given by VA/Q, thatis,total value added by
manufacture divided by number of units.(In the present case, only goods
intended for human consumption are included.) In measuring the real cost
to farmers, the money cost of fabrication, per unit, is 'deflated' by an index
of the prices received by farmers for their products. In measuring the real
cost to wage earners, the money cost of fabrication, per unit, is 'deflated'
by an index of hourly rates of pay. The market .values of the services of
salaried workers are measured in terms of average annual income. Average
wholesale prices of non-agricultural raw materials furnish the standard used
for primary producers other than farmers. In each case changes in the448 PRICESIN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
money cost are reduced to changes in 'real' cosL by means of an index mea-
suring changes in the money price of the good; or services sold by the con-
suming group in question.
Here, as in dealing with the fortunes of producing groups, we ate dealing
only with approximations to the actual values desired. The measurements
of changes in the realized returns of fabricators may not measure precisely
changes in the per unit cost of fabrication, as paid by the several consuming
groups.Distributional margins may vary. we only approximate
changes in the actual effort expended by consuming groups, in secur-
ing the funds with which manufactured good; are to be purchased. The
productivity of labor in farming, for example, may vary with time. But for
the purpose of estimating the general nature of broad movements, these
approximations may be utilized.
quired to manufacture one unit of goods, provide a standard
with which may be compared measurc:ments of the changing
real costs of fabrication, per unit cf product, to various
classes of buyers of goods intendedhuman consumption.
During the period 1899—1914, when fabricators, as produc-
ers, were gaining but slightly from the increases in industrial
productivity, the cost to farmers and wage earners of fabri-
cators' services was dropping sharply. Per unit of product
bought, the real cost of these services to farmers declined 2 1
per cent, to wage earners 23 per cent. These reductions were
about equal to the decline in effort expended in fabrication,
as a result of advancing productivity. Salaried workers gained
also, but primary producers other than farmers received no
share of the advances in industrial productivity.
In the period 1914—29 the productive effort required to
fabricate a unit of manufactured goods dropped more than
32 per cent. None of this gain accrued to farmers or to other
primary producers. Wage earners in general and salaried
workers in manufacturing industries, as consumers, gained
materially, however. Their pay for efforts expended increased,
and the real cost to them of manufacturing services dropped
appreciably. The wage earning grouD here represented is
broader than the manufacturing group, but the nar-PRODUCT1VITY AND PRICES 449
rower group enjoyed a similar gain. Both as producers and
as consumers industrial workers gained over this period.
During the four years from 1929to1933industrialpro-
ductivity continued to increase; the real per unit cost of
fabrication was reduced i6 per cent. On the producing side
wage earners and ownership and management gained, in
that their monetary rewards, per man hour worked, in-
creased in purchasing power. (Of course, these two groups
lost materially in the aggregate, through the reduction in
total hours worked.) Among consumers farmers lost heavily.
The selling prices of their products dropped so sharply that
the real cost, in kind, of the fabricational services embodied
in a unit of manufactured goods increased 50 per cent. Sal-
aried workers lost also. Producers of non-agricultural raw
materials gained slightly, but the greatest gain was scored
by wage earners. An hour of labor, in 1933, would buy i6
per cent more in manufactured goods than in
3 These measurements relate only to the cost of fabrication, not to the total
selling price of manufactured goods. This limitation is necessary, since the
productivity measurements are restricted to manufacturing operations. How-
ever, the actual cost of manufactured goods to final includes the cost
of materials, and distributive costs, as well as fabricational costs. Data now
available do not cover distributive costs, but we may estimate changes in the
real cost, to various consuming groups, of manufactured goods intended [or
human consumption, taking account of material costs as well as fabricational
costs. Following are measurements corresponding to those given, for fabri-
cational costs alone, in the tabulation in the text above.
1899—19141914—19291929—1933
(percentage)
Change in real per unit cost of fabrication
and materials to buyers of goods intended
for human consumption
Farmers —16.5 —0.1 +83.0
Wage earners, general _ig.i —36.8 —23.6
Salaried workers, manufacturing —7.0 —28.6
Primary producers, nonagricultural+5.5 +4.8 —12.7
When we take account, as we do here, of the actual selling prices of450 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
In attempting to measure changes in the real costs of fab-
ricators' services we have dealt with specific groups of con-
sumers for whom records are available of changes in the
prices of the goods or services from which their incomes are
received. These are, of necessity, scattered groups, and do
not include all consumers. We may sipplement the preced-
ing account with a brief survey of changes in prices and
costs expressed in dollars of constant purchasing power, at
wholesale. (That is, each price or cost has been divided
by an index of general wholesale prices.) This procedure
does not provide true measures of changing real costs to
consumers, since consumers do not buy at wholesale prices,
nor are changes in their rewards, for efforts expended, ac-
curàtely measured by changes in wholesale prices. But the
comparison does provide general indications of the changing
real worth of manufactured goods and of the services of
agents of fabrication in terms of a broad list of commodities
at wholesale. The measurements on page 451definethese
changes.
These figures are estimates, but the margin of error is
far smaller than the wide movemenl:s they measure. The
shifts are striking. A decline of someper cent in the per
unit cost of fabrication(in human effort) over the fifteen
years prior to the War was paralleled by a drop of 10per
cent in the average worth of manufactured goods intended
for human consumption, of 14 per cent in the average per
unit cost, to ultimate consumers, of the services of fabrica-
tors. There was some concurrent gair.L, not here shown, in
the rewards of raw material producer5. But a large portion
manufactured goods the apparent savings of consu.mers during the first period
are reduced, those of the second and third periods are increased, in com-
parison with the changes in fabrication costs alone. The reason, of course,
is that raw material prices rose more than prices in general during the pre-
War period, but fell below general prices in the succeeding periods.PRODUCTIVITY AND PRICES 451
1899—19141914—19291929—1933
(percentage)
Change in real, per unit cost of fabrica-
tion in effort expended by producers 1 —23 —33
Estimated change in average per unit
worth of manufactured goods intended
for human consumption (worth mea-
sured in dollars of constant purchasing
power, at wholesale) —io +3 —8
Estimated changeinaveragecostof
fabrication, to consumers, per unit of
manufactured goods intended for hu-
man consumption(cost measured in
dollars of constant purchasing power,
at wholesale) —14 +19 ±2
1 Industrialproductivity, with reference to which these measurements of
changing fabrication costs are estimated, is measured in terms of output per
wage earner for the periods 1899—1914and1914—29,outputper. man hour
for the period 1929—33.
ofthe gains from increased productivity was passed on to
consumers in the form of lower prices. Production expanded,
employment opportunities increased, and labor displacement
was kept to a minimum.4 Over the fifteen-year period from
1914 to 1929 there was a net reduction of approximately 33
per cent in the real cost of fabrication. This exceeded the
considerable savings of human energy during the pre-War
period. Yet the average selling price of manufactured goods
in 1929 was someper cent higher, in dollars of constant
purchasing power, than in 1914.Inspite of the tremendous
gain in productive efficiency in manufacturing industries,
buyers of manufactured goods were forced to give more for
them, in commodities at large, than in 1914.Thefinal entry
for this period indicates who actually gained from the in-
4Industrialdisplacement during this period is discussed in Economic Tend-
encies (pp. 419—23).Fromi8gg to only one of every 48 men employed
withdrew from or was forced out of the in which he was working,
over each five-year census period. (The figure given is an average, of course.).452 PRICESIN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
crease in productivity. Although productive efficiency went
up, the per unit cost to consumers of the services of agents
of fabrication showed a net advance of some iper cent. A
substantial portion of the gains from increased productivity
during the post-War period was reaped by agents of fabrica-
tion. Indeed, since the prices of fabricated goods advanced,
in relation to general commodities at wholesale, it would
appear that agents of fabrication gai.ned more than the re-
wards of increased productivity, actually encroaching upon
the incomes of other economic groups.
Tendencies of the same sort persisted during the years of
recession from 1929 to 1933. Productivity continued to in-
crease, and real fabrication costs were reduced approximately
i6 per cent. Average per unit selling prices of goods intended
for human consumption were reduced, in terms of constant
dollars, but by only half the apparent decline in real fabrica-
tional costs. That this drop wasdueto declining material
costs is revealed by the final entry in the table. The cost to
consumers of fabricators' services, per unit of consumption
goods produced, advanced 2 per ceni: during this period of
recession, in spite of the increase in productivity.5
5Certainimportant qualifying considerations should be noted. The figures
cited are fully accurate, as measurements of the changing rewards of fabri-
cators, only on the assumption that fabrication played the same role in
production in the different years compared. Itis assumed, in other words,
that no change occurred in the quality of goods, as a result
of more refined fabrication. Such quality changes did occur. The average
finished product of 1933representedmore 'units' of fabrication, fewer Units'
of raw materials, than did the average finishe:1 product of 1914.However,
these quality changes do not explain the shift in the relative rewards
of fabricators. Detailed study of the records of individual manufacturing in-
dustries reveals a general advance in fabricational costs, not compensated by
corresponding changes in quality. If full account could be taken of quality
changes the apparent gains of fabricators from 1914to1933 would be less-
ened, but by no means reversed.
Again, our conclusions are restricted by the assumption that the actualPRODUCTIVITY AND PRICES 453
The survey of productivity changes in manufacturing in-
dustries and their incidence between 1899and1933has
yielded the following general conclusions:
The increase of 30 per cent in productivity from 1899 to 1914,
andthe corresponding decline of 23 per cent in the productive
effort required to fabricate a unit of goods, benefited consuming
groups. Agents of fabrication, as producers, secured only a small
portion of these gains.
The increase of 49 per cent in productivity from 1914to1929,
and the corresponding decline of 33 per cent in productive effort
required to fabricate a unit of goods, worked largely to the ad-
vantage of producing groups. A substantial portion of the total
gain in productivity was secured by manufacturing wage earners,
as producers, while ownership and management scored gains
actually exceeding the advance in productivity. Wage earners
and salaried workers, as consumers, also benefited, but consum-
effort of production may be measured in terms of number of men employed
or of man hours of labor expended. This would be accurate if we could take
account of all the indirect labor embodied in capital equipment. This is
done only in part in the measurements here employed. Because some of
the capital goods used in production embody labor not included in our
measurements, the actual advances in productivity and the actual reductions
in productive effort expended on each unit of goods were probably somewhat
smaller than those here indicated.
In assessing the gains ot labor no account is taken of displacement and
unemployment, resulting from technological change. We have attempted to
define changes in the real rewards secured per worker or per hour of labor,
not variations in the aggregate rewards of labor as a class. For the purpose
of the present analysis itis proper to measure real rewards in terms of a
man or a man hour unit.
Finally, the index numbers used in the deflating process, in attempting to
measure changes in the real rewards oboth producing and consuming
groups, are not exact instruments. A margin of error which we may not
precisely define is present in using them for the purpose of shifting from
the money level to the commodity level of contributions and rewards. Here,
as in other respects, the instruments used provide approximations to the
desired results rather than definitive measurements. It is improbable, how-
ever, that closer approximations would reverse the essential features of the
movements recorded in the text.454 PRICES IN RECESSION AN]) RECOVERY
ing groups drawing incomes from the sale of primary products
actually experienced advances in the real costs of the manufac-
tured goods they purchased.(If account could be taken of the
gain in productivity in agriculture and mining over this period
the position of primary producers in 1929, relatively to 1914,
would be more favorable than the present figures indicate.)
The increase of 19 per cent in output per man hour from 1929
to 1933, and the corresponding drop of i6 per cent in the pro-
ductive effort required to fabricate a unit of goods, worked
chiefly to the advantage of producers. Wage earners, as con-
sumers, gained also, since hourly rates of pay were maintained,
but no other consuming group among those here dealt with
shared appreciably in the cost reduction. Farmers were forced to
meet a very great advance in the real costs, to them, of fabricat-
ing services on the goods they purchased..
Certain rather important reservations attaching to these
various measurements have been suggested in preceding
pages. Correction for possible errors if they could
be made, would doubtless change the measurements some-
what, but it is unlikely that our conclusions concerning the
general movements of the periods covered would be mate-
rially modified. Over the thirty-four years here reviewed the
productivity of manufacturing industries increased steadily;
indeed there is evidence of acceleration. But the gains result-
ing from advancing productivity we:ce allocated in quite
different ways in the several periods reviewed. The essential
fact is that prior tO 1914 the major sl:iare of the benefits of
higher productivity and declining real costs of fabrication
went to consumers; thereafter the chief shares went to pro-
ducing groups—to wage earners, and management.
The reasons for this striking shift in the incidence of in-
creasing productivity can not be fully established, but cer-
tain of the major factors may be briefly suggested.
The pre-War period was marked by a general and sus-PRODUCTIVITY AND PRICES 455
tamed advance in commodity prices. During the later period,
following the sharp War-time advance, a considerable net
decline in prices occurred. Labor costs and overhead charges,
which are important elements of the fabricational margin,
tend to lag behind the level of wholesale prices. Accordingly
such costs, as a percentage of selling price, tend to decline
when the trend of prices is rising, to increase when the trend
is declining.
During the War a strong stimulus was given to the pro-
duction of raw materials outside Europe. When the special
needs of the War passed and when European countries re-
turned again to full productive activity, raw material pro-
ducers were in a weak market position. The decline in the
prices of primary products strengthened the relative position
of fabricators. Price weakness among primary producers per-
sisted during a large part of the jost-War decade and during
the latest recession. This weakness and the relative strength
of fabricators contributed to the change noted in the division
of the total value product of manufacturing industries.
The restriction of immigration into the United States
strengthened the bargaining position of American labor in
the War and post-War years. This was accompanied by a
fairly general change in the attitude of large employers on
the wage question. The principle of maintaining purchasing
power through high wages was widely endorsed. Acceptance
of this principle was partly responsible for the increase in the
share received by manufacturing labor in the fruits of ad-
vancing productivity.
During the first post-War decade consumer demand was
heavily supported by important non-recurring elements. A
greatly expanded reservoir of credit was drawn upon to
finance the increase in installment purchasing. Speculative
profits, reaped in securities and real estate markets, were in
part used to purchase consumption goods. Lending abroad456 PRICES iN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
on a large scale supported heavy foreign purchases. With
demand thus strengthened it was easier for the sellers of
manufactured goods to maintain the fabricational margin
and the selling prices of manufactured goods, even though
productivity was increasing and of production were de-
clining.
We may think of the gains of industrial progress through
advancing productivity as being divided through a three-
cornered pulling and hauling contest among primary pro-
ducers, agents of fabrication and consumers. In pre-War
years primary producers and consumers stood in positions of
relative advantage and reaped most of the benefits of rising
productivity. The tide turned with the end of the War.
Primary producers lost bargaining power; the trend of prices
and special post-War circumstances contributed to strengthen
the position of fabricators. consumers, primary pro-
ducers were in a weak position. The buying power of other
important consuming groups was 2Lrtificially bolstered, so
that competitive pressure on the demand side, towards lower
prices, was greatly weakened.
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIVITY AND ECONOMIC FRICTIONS
The preceding pages have dealt with a variety of changes
that occurred during the War, the post-War expansion and
the recent years of recession and recovery. The adverse for-
tunes of primary producers, the expansion of fabricational
margins and the increased returns of fabricators, the per-
sistence of relatively high prices for many types of finished
consumers' goods and of capital equipment—these have been
characteristic of the entire period since the War and stand
in notable contrast to the conditions and tendencies prevail-
ing in the United States during the several decades before
the War. Coexistent with these conditions we have noted aPRODUCTIVITY AND PRICES 457
steady increase in industrial productivity in manufacturing
industries; unemployment that prevailed even under condi-
tions of general prosperity, that reached extreme proportions
during the depression and persisted with exceptional ob-
stinacy during recovery; the prevalence of inflexible prices
and of other economic rigidities that constitute important
sources of friction in the continuing processes of adaptation to
changing economic circumstances.
Many forces lie behind these phenomena. We should
unduly simplify a situation into which many variables enter
and in which causal connections run in diverse directions if
we should seek a single explanation of the conditions dis-
cussed in this study. Yet something of a unifying principle
is to be found in the relations traced in this chapter. Chang-
ing productivity and its diverse incidence, on the one hand,
economic frictions that impede prompt adaptation to such
changes, on the other, bulk large among the complex of
factors responsible for the spotty prosperity, the persistence
of unemployment and the shifts in price relations and in
the distribution of purchasing power that have characterized
recent years.
Changes in technology and related variations in industrial
productivity are perhaps the chief dynamic element in mod-
ern economic systems. Such changes are continually occur-
ring; recently they have been of exceptional magnitude. Their
direct effects and repercussions are felt over a wide range.
They involve substantial alterations in the manner in which
productive resources are used, in the demand for labor, in
production costs and prices and in the current distribution
of purchasing power. But the incidence of these changes is
subject to alteration. The character of demand for the prod-
ucts of the industries affected, the nature of the change in
productivity and the strategic power of the producing and
consuming groups directly concerned influence the immedi-458 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
ate results of an increase in productivity. So far, however,
it remains a somewhat narrow problem. Our social attitudes
and immediate economic interests, as individuals, may give
us reasons to be concerned with the effects of given changes
in productivity. So long as these are restricted to the groups
immediately involved in particular technical or organiza-
tional improvements the working of the economic system as
a whole is not affected. But because we do not have a per-
fectly flexible price system and fluid factors of production, the
repercussions of changes in productivity have general sig-
nificance and are of high importancethe study of economic
processes at large. When institutional conditions give rise to
serious frictions and delays in the adaptation of the elements
of an economy to changes in productivity, when the opera-
tions of the entire system are adversely affected, then such
changes cease to be of narrow and specialized interest only.
In preceding pages emphasis was placed upon the role of
points of diffusion, centers from which the effects of changes
in industrial productivity were diffused throughout the price
and distributive system. In a frictionless, fluid economy these
effects would be as quickly from a few points of
diffusion as from many, and there would be prompt and im-
mediate adaptation to them. But when frictions are present
the number of points for the dissem:ination of the effects of
changes in productivity becomes of prime importance. With
many points of diffusion the influence of particular frictions
would be lessened, and prompt utilization of released ener-
gies, human and other, would be expected. With few points
of diffusion (as when restricted groups secure the first ad-
vantages of higher productivity) only a remote connection
would exist between the new purchasing power accruing to
particular economic groups and the energy released by ad-
vancing productivity, and the to prompt utilization
of these energies would be many. Tli.e frictions and impedi-PRODUCTIVITY AND PRICES 459
ments characteristic of a modern money economy would im-
pede the rapid spread of purchasing power shifted from its
original channels.
Of course, many evidences of prosperity may be present
even though gains in productivity are not reflected in lower
fabricational margins and reduced prices of finished goods.
Wage rates and the aggregate earnings of labor employed in
manufacturing industries may be high.6 Corporate earnings
may be large and the prices of securities may rise to high
levels. Indeed, the high fabricational margin made possible
by productivity gains not passed on to consumers may con-
duce to just these conditions. But when the advantages of
higher productivity find this outlet, prosperity may for long
periods be limited to special groups. The rewards of primary
producers may remain low, relatively to the prices of finished
goods. Volume of sales and of production may remain low,
in comparison with productive potentialities and the needs
of consumers at large. Unemployment will persist in large
volume. Industry will be burdened with high overhead
charges, because of the high cost of finished capital goods.
Ultimately, as the new purchasing power of favored groups
slowly diffuses through the economy, a higher level of activity
is to be expected unless further complications intervene. Yet
such complications may occur, giving rise to a semi-perma-
nent condition of concurrent prosperity among some eco-
nomic groups, unemployment and persistently low returns
to other groups. It is conceivable, under modern conditions,
that portions of the increased income of the favored groups
may never become effective in stimulating the productive
energies released in the first instance by the gain in produc-
6Thepart that wage payments in manufacturing industries play in the
buying activities of consumers at large is indicated by the fact that in 1929
suchwages constituted 14percent of the national income paid out; in
the corresponding percentage was ii.460 PRICESIN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
tivity. A loan abroad, expended in foreign markets and ulti-
mately disavowed by the borrower, exemplifies such a de-
velopment. Far more important as a cause of continuing
maladjustment of this type is the mere persistence of techno-
logical improvement, with new gains displacing workers in
one section while the frictions of a modern economy impede
the diffusion of the augmented purchasing power of favored
groups in other sections.
Precisely this condition has characterized the post-War
economic scene. Industrial and technological
unemployment were in evidence prior to the recession of
The whole post-War situation, marked by high fabri-
cational margins, high prices to consumers, high prices to
buyers of capital goods, relatively low rewards to primary
producers, is related to this basic fact. The gains of higher
productivity were reaped, in the main, by particular groups,
occupying strategic positions.8 Because of the many frictions
7 In each of the three biennial census from 1923 tO 1929 one man
out of 20, on the average, withdrew from or was forced out of the industry
in which he was working. This was more than double the separation rate
prevailing over census periods more than twi:e as long, prior to the War.
The separation rate increased greatly, of course, from 1929 to i933.
8 Confirmation of this statement is found in the rapid growth of profits, the
large additions to corporate surpluses and the high post-War level of real
wages in industrial enterprises (see Economic Tendencies, pp. 416—528). The
following figures reveal more sharply the relative gains of wage earners. The
industries here represented (commercial and 5avings banks, mining, manu-
facturing, construction, railroads, Pullman and express, water transport, street
railways, telephones and telegraphs, private:lectnc light and power com-
panies) extend beyond the industrial sphere, but the general tendencies we
have discussed are clearly shown by the composite figures. The averages given
have been computed from annual data cited by M. A. Copeland ("National
Wealth and Income—An Interpretation", of the American Statistical
Association, june 1935, p. 384). 1919—23 1924—28
Aggregate pay rolls as a percentage of
totalrealizedincome, banks and
non-farm industries 72.) 82.4 79.9 77.0
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presentin the post-War world, the process of diffusion, by
which the higher purchasing power of these groups was
brought into contact with the productive energies released
by advancing industrial efficiency, was protracted. Persistent
maladjustments, the most obvious of which was industrial
unemployment, were the outward manifestations of this con-
dition. Special circumstances in the form of fortuitous addi-
tions to the current income of consumers at large lessened,
for a time, the adverse effects. With the removal of these cir-
cumstances, and under the pressure of other forces during
recession, the maladjustments became pronounced from 1929
to1933.
Thecharacter of these maladjustments and the changes
during the recovery from 1933to1936 were discussed in
preceding chapters. This recovery has been fairly broad, in its
effects on economic groups. Price disparities have been re-
duced, the incomes of primary producers have been raised,
wage rates have advanced in manufacturing industries and
volume of employment has increased somewhat. Yet in spite
of these gains it cannot be said that prosperity is general in
1936, or that the benefits of recovery have been evenly ap-
portioned. Unemployment persists in great volume; the ag-
gregate volume of industrial production has barely touched
(Realized income is total income, excluding additions to corporate surplus.
The groups included accounted for about 40 per cent of the total realized
income of the country in 1929.)
The proportion of realized income going to wage earners in these indus-
tries advanced markedly over the decade 1909—13 to 1919—23. Some decline
occurred thereafter, but even the depression years witnessed a higher average
ratio of pay rolls to realized income than prevailed prior to the War. We
should note, too, that other portions of the fabricational margin were ex-
panding precisely when the pay roll percentage declined after 1923. Profits
rose markedly from 1923 to 1929, and overhead charges expanded relatively,
from 1929 to 1932.Theentire post-War period was marked by relatively
high disbursements to income recipients deriving their rewards from the
fabricational margin..
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the level of 1926, although the decade has brought an increase
of about eleven million in the po])ulation of the United
States. The rewards of primary producers remain relatively
low, if we exclude special benefits not arising from productive
operations. Fabricational costs are high, wage rates are high
and profit rates are advancing. fundamental require-
ments of a large volume of general production and a rate of
activity that will absorb the industrial unemployed have not
been met.
The situation, it has been here suggested, is related tO three
basic characteristics of post-War economic conditions in the
United States. First, industrial produc:tivity advanced notably.
From 1929to1936 the productivity of manufacturing indus-
tries in the United States showed an apparent increase of
some 25 per cent. This figure could be substantially reduced
to allow for possible errors but it would still represent a
notable advance in the efficiency cf industrial enterprise.
Second, the chief immediate gains of this great advance were
reaped by the fairly restricted groups directly engaged in
manufacturing operations, that is, by manufacturing labor
and the managers and owners of manufacturing plants.
Primary producers and the great body of general consumers
shared in only a limited degree in the fruits of higher pro-
ductivity. (Certain industries constitute exceptions to this
general condition.) Finally, this whole post-War period was
marked by economic frictions that retarded the necessary
adaptations to industrial change. Inflexible prices, relatively
fixed overhead charges, private control, governmental regula-
tion and other obstacles to the fluidity of productive agents—
these were not new to the post-War scene but they played
important parts in the developments of the last fifteen years.
The first of these three conditions meant that the flow of
current purchasing power was altered and that pro-
ductive energies were being released, from their accustomedPRODUCTIVITY AND PRICES 463
applications. The second meant that the accretions to the
purchasing power of the first beneficiaries of increased pro-
ductivity were being diffused from a limited number of
points, since primary producers and consumers at large
shared but slightly in the first gains. The third condition,
combined with the second, meant that adaptation and re-
adjustment to the changed conditions would be slow, that
effectiveconnections betweenaccretionstopurchasing
power and released productive energies would be tardily
established. Relatively wide fabricational margins, relatively
high prices of finished goods, spotty prosperity, persistent
unemployment and subnormal production are related to
these three basic conditions.
The technical changes, organizational improvements and
advances in individual aptitudes and skills that increase pro-
ductivity will continue. The forces that have brought such
advances in the past show no signs of weakening. Moreover,
economic frictions will persist. The free, flexible system
under which immediate adjustment to changes in operating
conditions could be effected never existed, in reality. Eco-
nomic forces proper have tended to create new frictions, as
earlier rigidities have broken down. Frictions of other types
are generated when social considerations are given precedence
over considerations of private gain. We must look forward
to a continuation of the conditions under which changing
productivity, on the one hand, and persistent frictions, on
the other, play central roles in the processes of economic life.
The effects of these conditions on the working of the
economic system as a whole will depend on the degree of
friction that prevails and on the manner in which the gains
of enhanced productivity are first apportioned. Economic
frictions will persist, but their growth may perhaps be cur-
tailed. If adequate social justification should be required for
every source of continuing economic friction, restrictions and464 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
disturbances that do not pay their way in social returns
might be reduced, with a resulting increase in the efficiency
of economic operations. This is not a suggestion that com-
petition should be unrestricted, or that public regulation
should cease. There is ample social justification for many of
the controls that exist today. It is probable, however, that
many of the price inflexibilities and other obstacles to the
prompt readjustment of economic relations that industrial
change necessitates arise from faulty policiesbusiness ad-
ministration and labor organization, monopolistic and semi-
monopolistic 'pockets' in the competitive system, needless
rigidity in rate regulation, attempts at control that outrun
our knowledge of the forces and relations involved. True,
we do not have a fully competitive system, and the currents
of social change seem to be moving us further away from
such a system. But in noting the man'y restrictions upon com-
petition we must not overlook the wide areas over which
fairly effective competition prevails. Our economic fortunes
and our living standards depend upon the working of a sys-
tçm still essentially competitive, artd in our appraisal of
economic ills we must recognize this fact. Until we have the
knowledge and the power necessary to a broader type of
economic planning and control than we have yet attempted,
we must depend upon essentially competitive forces for the
regulation of economic processes at large.If, under these
conditions, the advantages of increasing industrial produc-
tivity are to be widely shared, and if increases in productivity
are not to be allowed to cramp and retard the operations of
the productive system, restrictions upon the piling up of
socially unnecessary frictions, of private or public
origin, may be desirable.
In the main, however, it is not to a lessening of economic
frictions that we may look for escape from the difficulties we
face in seeking to avoid the losses and secure the gains ofPRODUCTIVITY AND PRICES 465
advancing productivity. In a system inevitably restricted by
necessary public regulation and by the operating conditions
of private industry, perhaps the chief means of minimizing
these difficulties is the immediate spreading of industrial
gains over the widest possible area. The cramping influence
of frictions may be reduced to a minimum when the benefits
of enhanced productivity are diffused from many centers.
The purchasing power that is shifted from one group to an-
other, as a result of technical or organizational improvements,
may in this manner be brought into most immediate contact
with the energies released by these improvements.
From a social point of view it is desirable that gains in
productivity should bring a larger output, with advanced
living standards for consumers at large, rather than special
advantages for some, coexisting with idleness of important
productive resources. These ends may be most readily at-
tained through a reduction in the selling prices of the finished
goods immediately affected by the productivity gain, a re-
duction equivalent to the saving in cost of production.9 For
° This statement of the conditions that arise with advances in productivity
deals with general considerations only, and with the strategy of economic
adjustment rather than with tactics. It does not take account of the prob-
lerns of the individual manufacturer in setting the selling price of a specific
commodity. On this level the issues are numerous and complicated. The
various elements of cost, on a per unit basis, are hard to differentiate, diffi-
cult to measure. The probable effect of a given change in price on volume
of sales is largely a matter of guess-work, until the step is taken. At a given
time many of the costs of the individual enterprise are fixed, and the manu-
facturer is not free to adjust them in the light of changed productive condi-
tions. Moreover, many manufacturers are several stages removed from the
final market, with numerous distributional costs, not open to their control,
intervening between their selling prices and the final prices paid by the con-
sumers. These various circumstances render the fixing of a suitable selling
price perhaps the hardest single problem confronting a manufacturing pro-
ducer. We gain only a distorted view of the issues faced in effecting social
adjustment to changes in industrial productivity if we fail to recognize the
complexity of the price-setting problems of individual manufacturers, and466 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
goods of elastic demand this would mean immediate absorp-
tion of all or part of the energies released by the gain. For
goods of inelastic demand a shifting of productive resources
to other employment is inevitable. In either case the wide
sharing among consumers of the be::iefits of higher produc-
tivity would lessen the adverse influence of economic fric-
tions and contribute to a prompt usc of the released produc-
tive energies.
the meagerness of present economic concerning them. But the
price-making policies of business men, the tactics of intelligent business ad-
ministration, may be adapted to broader prir.ciples. The present statement
is concerned with such principles, relating to the task of adaptation to indus-
trial change under the existing economic organization.